Abstract: Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping was due to external influence and reputational concerns. Our data are statistically indistinguishable from those of Charness and Dufwenberg and therefore provide strong evidence that their observed effects regarding the impact of communication are due to internal factors and not due to an outside bystander.
INTRODUCTION
Anecdotal and scientific evidence suggest that promises -commitments to perform a certain action -are a powerful tool in increasing levels of cooperation. What makes people keep their promises and why do their recipients trust them? In a widely cited paper, Gary Charness and Martin Dufwenberg (2006, p. 1579; hereafter C&D) argue that "The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt." Drawing upon the literature on psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2008) , C&D (p. 1579) model, "A guilt-averse player [as one who] suffers from guilt to the extent he believes he hurts others relative to what they believe they will get. Therefore, he is motivated by his beliefs about others' beliefs." This guilt aversion (see also Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) is treated as an internal influence on a player and not reliant on external enforcement.
To test the conjecture that promise keeping is driven by guilt aversion, C&D employ a game with hidden action in which one player never learns whether a promise was kept or not. While C&D provide evidence that promises strengthen beliefs about one's cooperation and that these promises are often kept, their experimental design also allows for an alternative explanation. In particular, their experiments were conducted using a standard single blind (or low social distance) protocol in which the players did not know the identity of their counterpart, but the experimenter did. Further, the experimenter could observe both the message and the act before paying the participant in person. Therefore, their experiment does not distinguish whether the observed behavior is due to internal guilt aversion or due to external influence and reputational concerns.
Previous research has shown that subjects in related games behave differently when the experimenter can identify who took which action (single blind) and when the experimenter cannot (double blind).
1 Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996) found that dictators acted in a far more selfish manner under double blind procedures than under any of the other treatments they considered. Cox and Deck (2005) report the results of a binary trust game using both single and double blind procedures. With single blind procedures, they replicate the results of McCabe and Smith (2000) that approximately 75% of second movers are trustworthy. However, under double blind procedures only 25% of the subjects are trustworthy. Such a radical change in behavior clearly demonstrates the impact that observability by the experimenter can have on behavior where trust is involved.
We replicate the study of C&D under a double blind protocol. Observed behavior is very similar to the results of C&D suggesting that the trustworthy behavior is in fact due to internal guilt aversion.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
We focus on the (5,5) game with messages of C&D. Player 1 can choose Out in which case both players get $5. Alternatively, player 1 can choose In, in which case the choice of player 2 will determine the payoffs of both players. If player 2 chooses Don't Roll then player 1 earns $0 and player 2 earns $14. If player 2 chooses Roll then player 2 earns $10 and player 1 earns $12 if a die roll ends up on 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 and earns $0 if the die roll ends up on 1. Thus, player 1 cannot determine if a payoff of $0 is due to a selfish act by player 2 or simple bad luck.
Following C&D, prior to Player 1 making a decision, the matched player 2 had the option to send a handwritten message to player 1. Subjects were told that the only thing that could not be put in the message was personally identifying information.
We implement a double blind payoff procedure similar to that in Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) , Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) , Cox (2002 Cox ( , 2009 ), Deck (2005, 2006) , and Servátka (2009) . As subjects entered the lab, they drew slips indicating if they were in the A role (player 1) or B role (player 2). Bs sat on the left in the back half of the lab and As sat on the left in the front half of the lab. Each person was seated at individual workstation with privacy dividers. Instructions, included in Appendix A, were then handed out to everyone and all questions were answered publicly. After any questions were answered, a large curtain was drawn most of the way across the room from left to right so that everyone could verify that the procedures were implemented as described in the instructions, but could not see from back to front or vice versa. At this point, identical envelopes with coded mailbox keys and coded response forms were placed in a large box. This box was taken around the B half of the lab and subjects drew out a single envelope, but waited to open it until the experimenters had returned to the A side. B subjects made their decisions, placed the mailbox key in their pocket, and returned the response form into the envelope. After Bs finished, they dropped their envelopes back into the large box. The envelopes were then shuffled and opened in the gap between the two rooms. Everyone could observe the envelopes being opened, but could not see anything written on the forms. Messages were then checked for appropriateness, cut off from the B forms, and stapled to coded response forms for As. This procedure ensured that nobody could link the decision to a subject's identity, but the experimenters could still correctly map the subjects' decisions into their payoffs. The forms were then placed in envelopes along with a coded mailbox key. As then selected an envelope from a box of envelopes and waited for the experimenters to return to the B side before opening the envelopes, placing the keys into their pockets, making their decisions, and then returning the forms into the envelopes. When everyone was done, the experimenters determined the payoffs for each player 2 , placed the money in plain envelopes, and then placed the envelopes in the coded mailboxes in another room in the lab. Subjects went into the room, opened their mailboxes, collected their earnings envelopes, dropped their keys into a box, and left the lab.
A total of 90 undergraduate students at the University of Arkansas participated in this study in groups of size 8 to 14. While some had been in unrelated studies, none had participated in any similar studies in the past. Participant received a $5 payment in addition to their salient earning from the game. Table 1 compares behavior between the single blind procedures of C&D and our double blind variation. As is clear from the table, the percentage of As who trust and choose In is similar in both studies (67% in C&D and 68% here). The percentage of Bs who are trustworthy and choose Roll is nominally, but not statistically, lower under double blind (74% in C&D and 64% here). Both studies find that half of the pairs end up at the socially optimal outcome where A goes In and B Rolls. These results are really surprising given the results of previous comparisons between single and double blind treatments have found large changes in behavior and uniformly found more selfish behavior with the procedure. We now turn to the impact of promises on behavior. Each of the 45 messages was scored by four paid coders. Coders were instructed to categorize each message as being blank (i.e. no message), a promise, or empty talk. Appendix B gives the instructions to the coders as well as the each message and how it was scored. Table 2 shows behavior by the category of the message sent/received. The four coders did not agree on the coding of three messages. We take a conservative approach and exclude the three pairs associated with those messages from the analysis. The person in the A role who was matched with the person in the B role who did not make a choice to either Roll or Don't Roll is included in the analysis, but the person in the B role is not.
RESULTS
As are more trusting when a promise is received relative to the case when no message is received (80% versus 45%, z-statistic = -1.82, p-value = 0.098). However, As are also more trusting when an empty talk is received (75% versus 45%, z-statistic = -1.65, p-value = 0.098) and do not distinguish between promises and empty talk (80% versus 75%, z-statistic = -0.28, pvalue = 0.781).
We find that a high percentage (89%) of Bs keep their promise to Roll. The frequency with which Bs who promise to Roll actually Roll is significantly greater than the frequency with which those who opt to send no message actually Roll (89% versus 45%, z-statistic = -2.22, p-value = 0.026). Somewhat surprisingly, Bs who send empty talk messages are more likely to actually Roll than those who send no message (83% versus 45%, z-statistic = -2.14, p-value = 0.033), but are indistinguishable from those who sent a promise (83% versus 89%, z-statistic = 0.36, p-value = 0.719).
As with the overall data, we find no evidence on any differences between the two studies when conditioning on message type. When A receives a promise we observe 80% choosing In while C&D report that 92% choose In, an insignificant difference (z-statistic = 0.96, p-value = 0.336). When A receives either a blank message or a non-promise, we observe 50% choosing In while C&D report that 56% choose In, an insignificant difference (z-statistic = -0.43, p-value = 0.670).
We observed that 89% of Bs keep their promise to Roll while C&D report that 75% do so, an insignificant difference (z-statistic = -0.87, p-value = 0.385). Finally, we observed that 59% of Bs Roll when no promises was made while C&D report that 56% do so, an insignificant difference (z-statistic = -0.26, p-value = 0.793).
CONCLUSIONS
C&D conduct an innovative experiment to explore guilt aversion as a motivation for behavior. They model behavior using psychological game theory and observe choices consistent with people keeping promises because of the internal motivation of not wanting to let someone down. However, their experimental design leaves open the alternative explanation that observed behavior was due to concern about their own reputation and interaction with the experimenters. We modify C&D procedures using a double blind social distance protocol that eliminates this alternative explanation. Our findings are statistically indistinguishable from those of C&D: promises by one player influence behavior of the other player and also that promises are kept. Given that previous work has shown that people behave in a more selfish manner under a double blind experimental design, our results provide strong evidence that the effects regarding the impact of communication documented by C&D are not caused by external influence and reputational concerns.
Decision Tasks
In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair.
On the designated decision sheet, each person A will indicate whether he or she wishes to choose IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, A and B each receive $5. We will collect these sheets after the choices have been indicated. Next, each person B will indicate whether he or she wishes to choose ROLL or DON'T ROLL (a die). Note that B will not know whether A has chosen IN or OUT; however, since B's decision will only make a difference when A has chosen IN, we ask B's to presume (for the purpose of making this decision) that A has chosen IN.
If 
A Message
Prior to the decision by A concerning IN or OUT, B has an option to send a message to A. Each B receives a blank sheet, on which a message can be written, if desired. We will allow time as needed for people to write messages, then these will be collected. Please print clearly if you are B and you wish to send a message to A.
In these messages, no one is allowed to identify him or herself by name or number or gender or appearance. (The experimenter will monitor the messages. Violations, as determined by the experimenter, will result in B receiving only the $5 show-up fee, and the paired A receiving the average amount received by other A's.) Other than these restrictions, B may say anything that he or she wishes in this message. If B does not wish to not send a message, B should simply write an "X" in the space provided.
Payoff Procedures
Each of you will receive a "code." The code will be written on your response form. The purpose of this code is so that the experimenters can insure that any message sent by B is received by the paired A. The code also allows the experimenters to insure that your payoff is based on your action and the action of the person with whom you are paired while maintaining that no participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired.
The code you receive will also be on a "key." After the experiment is completed, you will be able to receive your cash payment in a sealed envelope from a locked mailbox, located in another room here in the lab. The envelopes will be identical on the outside, so that no one, including the experimenter, will ever know the decision, message, or payoff of any participant. To protect your anonymity, you should place the coded key in your pocket once you receive it. After you have collected your payoff envelope, there will be a container into which everyone will drop their keys. The experimenter will cut this page along the dashed line and only the bottom portion will be sent to A, if you choose to send a message. Place an "X" in the provided space if you do not wish so send a message to A.
------------------------------------------------------------------
You may print a message to your paired A below if you wish.
